O-Minimal Hybrid Reachability Games

In this paper, we consider reachability games over general hybrid systems, and distinguish between two possible observation frameworks for those games: either the precise dynamics of the system is seen by the players (this is the perfect observation framework), or only the starting point and the delays are known by the players (this is the partial observation framework). In the first more classical framework, we show that time-abstract bisimulation is not adequate for solving this problem, although it is sufficient in the case of timed automata . That is why we consider an other equivalence, namely the suffix equivalence based on the encoding of trajectories through words. We show that this suffix equivalence is in general a correct abstraction for games. We apply this result to o-minimal hybrid systems, and get decidability and computability results in this framework. For the second framework which assumes a partial observation of the dynamics of the system, we propose another abstraction, called the superword encoding, which is suitable to solve the games under that assumption. In that framework, we also provide decidability and computability results

Model-checking Timed Temporal Logics

AbstractIn this paper, we present several timed extensions of temporal logics, that can be used for model-checking real-time systems. We give different formalisms and the corresponding decidability/complexity results. We also give intuition to explain these results

Finite Bisimulations for Dynamical Systems with Overlapping Trajectories

Having a finite bisimulation is a good feature for a dynamical system, since it can lead to the decidability of the verification of reachability properties. We investigate a new class of o-minimal dynamical systems with very general flows, where the classical restrictions on trajectory intersections are partly lifted. We identify conditions, that we call Finite and Uniform Crossing: When Finite Crossing holds, the time-abstract bisimulation is computable and, under the stronger Uniform Crossing assumption, this bisimulation is finite and definable

On the computation of Nash equilibria in games on graphs

International audienceIn this talk, I will show how one can characterize and compute Nash equilibria in multiplayer games played on graphs. I will present in particular a construction, called the suspect game construction, which allows to reduce the computation of Nash equilibria to the computation of winning strategies in a two-player zero-sum game

Timed Automata May Cause Some Troubles

Timed automata are a widely studied model. Its decidability has been proved using the so-called region automaton construction. This construction provides a correct abstraction for the behaviours of timed automata, but it does not support a natural implementation and, in practice, algorithms based on the notion of zones are implemented using adapted data structures like DBMs. When we focus on forward analysis algorithms, the exact computation of all the successors of the initial configurations does not always terminate. Thus, some abstractions are often used to ensure termination, among which, a widening operator on zones. In this paper, we study in details this widening operator and the forward analysis algorithm that uses it. This algorithm is most used and implemented in tools like Kronos and Uppaal. One of our main results is that it is hopeless to find a forward analysis algorithm, that uses such a widening operator, and which is correct. This goes really against what one could think. We then study in details this algorithm in the more general framework of updatable timed automata, a model which has been introduced as a natural syntactic extension of classical timed automata. We describe subclasses of this model for which a correct widening operator can be found

When are Stochastic Transition Systems Tameable?

A decade ago, Abdulla, Ben Henda and Mayr introduced the elegant concept of decisiveness for denumerable Markov chains [1]. Roughly speaking, decisiveness allows one to lift most good properties from finite Markov chains to denumerable ones, and therefore to adapt existing verification algorithms to infinite-state models. Decisive Markov chains however do not encompass stochastic real-time systems, and general stochastic transition systems (STSs for short) are needed. In this article, we provide a framework to perform both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis of STSs. First, we define various notions of decisiveness (inherited from [1]), notions of fairness and of attractors for STSs, and make explicit the relationships between them. Then, we define a notion of abstraction, together with natural concepts of soundness and completeness, and we give general transfer properties, which will be central to several verification algorithms on STSs. We further design a generic construction which will be useful for the analysis of {\omega}-regular properties, when a finite attractor exists, either in the system (if it is denumerable), or in a sound denumerable abstraction of the system. We next provide algorithms for qualitative model-checking, and generic approximation procedures for quantitative model-checking. Finally, we instantiate our framework with stochastic timed automata (STA), generalized semi-Markov processes (GSMPs) and stochastic time Petri nets (STPNs), three models combining dense-time and probabilities. This allows us to derive decidability and approximability results for the verification of these models. Some of these results were known from the literature, but our generic approach permits to view them in a unified framework, and to obtain them with less effort. We also derive interesting new approximability results for STA, GSMPs and STPNs.Comment: 77 page

Model Checking One-clock Priced Timed Automata

We consider the model of priced (a.k.a. weighted) timed automata, an extension of timed automata with cost information on both locations and transitions, and we study various model-checking problems for that model based on extensions of classical temporal logics with cost constraints on modalities. We prove that, under the assumption that the model has only one clock, model-checking this class of models against the logic WCTL, CTL with cost-constrained modalities, is PSPACE-complete (while it has been shown undecidable as soon as the model has three clocks). We also prove that model-checking WMTL, LTL with cost-constrained modalities, is decidable only if there is a single clock in the model and a single stopwatch cost variable (i.e., whose slopes lie in {0,1}).Comment: 28 page

Pure Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Deterministic Games

We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a two-player turn-based game which turns Nash equilibria into winning strategies (for some objective that depends on the preference relations of the players in the original game). We use that transformation to design algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in finite games, which in most cases have optimal worst-case complexity, for large classes of preference relations. This includes the purely qualitative framework, where each player has a single omega-regular objective that she wants to satisfy, but also the larger class of semi-quantitative objectives, where each player has several omega-regular objectives equipped with a preorder (for instance, a player may want to satisfy all her objectives, or to maximise the number of objectives that she achieves.)Comment: 72 page

Nash Equilibria in Games over Graphs Equipped with a Communication Mechanism

We study pure Nash equilibria in infinite-duration games on graphs, with partial visibility of actions but communication (based on a graph) among the players. We show that a simple communication mechanism consisting in reporting the deviator when seeing it and propagating this information is sufficient for characterizing Nash equilibria. We propose an epistemic game construction, which conveniently records important information about the knowledge of the players. With this abstraction, we are able to characterize Nash equilibria which follow the simple communication pattern via winning strategies. We finally discuss the size of the construction, which would allow efficient algorithmic solutions to compute Nash equilibria in the original game